Shall I break it to you gently?

Communicating risk accurately and realistically is one of the trickiest things to do successfully in public relations. Just ask any government minister or scientist who’s had the pleasure of informing the general public about a food poisoning scare, or a new avian virus, or some rogue prions in their Barnsley chop. Worst of all: placating frightened townsfolk about the nuclear power plant that’s just been announced will be built 10 miles away. So with this in mind, it was with great interest that I recently listened to a fascinating presentation from Prof. Ragnar Löfstedt, director of the King’s Centre for Risk Management, about how the public responds to news of different types of risk.

Prof Löfstedt made two key points which are highly relevant to PRs and communicators. The first is that a known range of factors associated with a risk will influence the level of public alarm. The second is that the strategy used to communicate the risk will also affect the public’s response.

So, first, the factors which influence the level of public concern: according to Prof Löfstedt, the public will be more fearful of a risk that is technological in origin rather than natural, hence we’re more worried about nuclear power plants than earthquakes. We’re also alarmed more by risks over which we have no control and to which our exposure is involuntary, compared with risks we can control and choose to expose ourselves to. This explains why most of us don’t worry about our mobile phones but do worry about the effect of their base stations; it’s also why the thousands of deaths from motor accidents don’t make us anxious to get in a car, but a few hundred deaths in plane crashes bring us out in a cold sweat as we board an aircraft. (I’ve listed all Prof. Löfstedt’s influencing factors in the slides below.)

Second, the manner in which you communicate risk affects the public response: putting a scientist or minister on the evening news to offer reassurance is the classic approach – and the worst. According to Prof. Löfstedt, this top-down strategy has been rendered ineffective by the erosion of public trust in authority figures, a phenomenon caused in some part the government’s handling of the BSE scare. Much more effective is either a dialogue or a bottom-up approach – going to the local community, engaging in a dialogue, negotiating on possible risk mitigation strategies. (This seems to be the approach taken by the major supermarkets when seeking to build in a new area.)

Trust is also a key factor in determining the level of public alarm. The more trusted the purveyor of the message, the lower the perception of risk. On this basis, the government might be wise to call upon the services of Dame Judi Dench, Stephen Fry or Sir David Attenborough the next time it wants to announce a food scare. The value of trust is paramount: statistically speaking, trust is nine times easier to erode than to build.

The use of numbers to illustrate level of risk is also problematic. Prof. Löfstedt argues that the public doesn’t understand numbers so quoting percentage chances at them or predicted death tolls either does nothing or exacerbates the situation. A colloquial or anecdotal approach is more effective: “You have about as much chance of dying in a plane crash as you do of winning the National Lottery twice. (I made that up but you get the idea.)

So the next time you find yourself having to communicate a risk to an audience, have a think about Prof. Löfstedt’s work. It may well just help you prevent an issue turning into a full-blown crisis.

If you’d like to know more about Prof. Löfstedt’s work, have a look here.

Written by Adrian Beeby